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RECOGNIZING CIVIL RICO IN FOREIGN 
COURTS: SINCE THEY CAME, SHOULD WE 
BUILD IT? 
“The periods in which countries have produced their greatest jurists, 
and exercised the widest influence, are those in which the concerns 
these jurists addressed were the least national.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
ike a Hollywood blockbuster, this case contains an irresistibly 
thrilling set of ingredients: a transnational conspiracy implicating 
a prominent financial institution, an Eastern European crime syndicate 
facilitating transactions, billions of dollars changing hands, a public 
scandal, a high profile FBI investigation, a Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) nonprosecution agreement, and, to top it off, a House Commit-
tee on Financial Services hearing.2 All of this transpired almost a decade 
ago, but only recently did the drama culminate when Russia’s Federal 
Customs Service3 (“FCS”) filed a lawsuit against the Bank of New York4 
(“BONY”). To ponder the lawsuit’s aftermath and highlight its legal 
nuances will require us to take a few steps back and proceed with  
caution. 
                                                                                                             
 1. James Gordley, Comparative Legal Research: Its Function in the Development of 
Harmonized Law, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 567 (1995). 
 2. See generally Russian Money Laundering Before H. Comm. on Banking and  
Financial Services, 106th Cong. 152 (1999) (testimony of Thomas A. Renyi, Chairman 
of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, The Bank of New York Company, Inc.), avail-
able at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/92299ren.htm [hereinafter Committee 
Hearing on Russian Money Laundering]; Roger Parloff, Can a U.S. Bank get a Fair Trial 
in Moscow?, FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 2008, at 126; Michael D. Goldhaber, RICO Goes to 
Russia, AM LAW DAILY, June 30, 2008, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/ 
2008/06/from-russia-wit.html; Devin Montgomery, Russia Resumes Racketeering Law-
suit Against US Bank, JURIST, July 28, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/ 
07/russia-resumes-racketeering-lawsuit.php. 
 3. “The Federal Customs Service is an authorized federal executive authority, which 
[carries] out its duties and functions in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federa-
tion with regard to the development of state policy and legal regulations, oversight and 
control over the customs issues . . . .” Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
[SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation], 2006, No. 459, Item 2162, avail-
able at http://www.customs.ru/en/about/regulations/gprovisions/. 
 4. The Bank of New York Mellon, a $189 billion bank holding company, is the 12th 
largest in the nation. Letter from Kenneth H. Thomas to Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, 
Federal Reserve System (June 20, 2008), http://www.russianbanksuit.com/Ken_Thomas_ 
letter_to_Ben_Bernankere_re_BONY.pdf. The Bank “was established by Alexander 
Hamilton as New York’s first bank.” Id. 
L
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In May 2007, the FCS filed a lawsuit in Russia against BONY in the 
Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow5 (“the Moscow Arbitrazh 
Court”). The FCS sought to recover customs duties6 that it allegedly 
should have collected on the $7.5 billion that a BONY employee, along 
with her accomplices, helped to transfer out of Russia during the 1990s.7 
The FCS also sought $22.5 billion in treble damages8 under the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act’s (“RICO”) civil compo-
nent as damages for the massive capital flight caused by the illegal wire 
transfers that nearly crippled Russia’s economy.9 It is the first RICO 
claim filed in a foreign court.10 The unprecedented nature of the case 
makes it unusual and inevitably raises numerous questions.11 Blindsided 
by the Moscow Arbitrazh Court’s decision to apply civil RICO, BONY 
was exposed to potential liability equivalent to $7.5 billion for the  
unlicensed wire transfers, as well as three times that amount in damages 
under civil RICO.12 
A civil RICO claim litigated in a Russian court against an American 
bank (the “Russian RICO case”) is a novel, if not bizarre, lawsuit with 
regard to procedural posture and choice-of-law principles. On the one 
hand, the Russian RICO case is the product of an innovative approach to 
transnational litigation13 where a foreign plaintiff seeking a civil remedy 
                                                                                                             
 5. Press Releases, The Bank of New York Mellon, Key Facts: Russia Litigation 1, 
http://www.bnymellon.com/Russiacase/keyfacts.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2008) [hereinafter 
Key Facts]. 
 6. See generally Ugolovnyi Kodeks RF [UK] [Criminal Code] art. 194 (Russ.), 
translated at http://www.russian-criminal-code.com/PartII/SectionVIII/Chapter22.html 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2008). While BONY was alleging that this was a typical lost reve-
nue claim, FCS denied the allegations. See Goldhaber, supra note 2. Custom duties are a 
tax in an economical sense, but if the statute, as it is here, appears in the Criminal Code, it 
may be argued that, legally speaking, the claim for custom duties is not for the revenue. 
Regardless, BONY would presumably have attempted to defend the recognition action as 
contrary to the revenue rule. See Key Facts, supra note 5, at 4. 
 7. Parloff, supra note 2, at 131. 
 8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). Section 1964(c) of RICO creates a private cause of 
action allowing “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation 
of [RICO to] sue . . . [and] recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .” Id. 
 9. See generally Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra note 5. 
 10. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 128; Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra note 
5, at 1. 
 11. See, e.g., Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 12. See, e.g., Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 13. Cf. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 
251, 278 (2006), reprinted in 1 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 
Commentary 2, at 12 (John Fellas ed., 2007) (criticizing the revenue rule that has been 
the roadblock to effective “transnational regulatory” litigation to recover lost revenue). 
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asks a court in its home forum to apply U.S. federal regulatory law14 
against a U.S. defendant.15 On the other hand, the FCS’s RICO claim 
may be described as the next “act” in the ongoing “saga” of foreign  
sovereign plaintiffs “knocking on the doors” of the U.S. courts to litigate 
similar claims.16 In these cases, foreign plaintiffs have lost revenues due 
to unpaid taxes or various duties that resulted from a pattern of transna-
tional racketeering activity.17 Having suffered damages, they have 
brought RICO claims in U.S. courts in order to enforce their domestic 
revenue laws but have been unsuccessful.18 The FCS’s attorneys, how-
ever, chose to file their claim in Russia, the FCS’s home forum.19 But 
some have argued that their claim is still essentially for lost revenue.20 
Transnational regulatory litigation—that is, litigation to obtain a remedy 
for economic harm resulting from cross-border transactions—has gained 
momentum and is likely here to stay.21 Because domestic regulation is 
inherently limited to its borders, the growing volume of cross-border 
transactions and economic interaction creates an ever-expanding regula-
tory gap.22 Plaintiffs from around the world are increasingly seeking re-
dress for malfeasance caused by foreign and multinational businesses 
                                                                                                             
Professor Buxbaum defines transnational regulatory litigation as private actions where 
national courts apply foreign or domestic economic regulatory law to remedy “cross-
border regulatory harm.” Id. at 255. 
 14. See JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 657–58 (3rd ed. 2003). 
 15. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 128; Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra note 
5, at 3; Montgomery, supra note 2. 
 16. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278–80 (discussing some of the recent 
claims that have failed due to the revenue rule); Elizabeth J. Farnam, Note & Comment, 
Racketeering, RICO and the Revenue Rule in Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Rey-
nolds: Civil RICO Claims for Foreign Tax Law Violations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 843, 846 
(2002). 
 17. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278–80. 
 18. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 103 
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the revenue rule barred Canada’s civil RICO lawsuit for lost 
tax revenues caused by R. J. Reynolds’ extensive tobacco smuggling scheme); see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987) (stating that courts in 
the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection 
of taxes). See generally Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278-80 (discussing the revenue rule 
and its role in “transnational regulatory” litigation); Farnam, supra note 16, at 846  
(arguing that the revenue rule should be abandoned). 
 19. See Goldhaber, supra note 2; see also Key Facts, supra note 5, at 1. 
 20. See sources cited supra note 19. 
 21. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 251. 
 22. See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory 
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 251–52 (2002). 
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situated in remote corners of the world, far from the reach of their home 
courts and legislatures.23 Many recognize that the U.S. civil litigation 
system—the world’s most developed—may play a significant role in fill-
ing the gap in the global regulatory system should it hear transnational 
litigation.24 
The international civil society and its legal community, however, may 
justifiably distrust empowerment of one nation’s judiciary resulting from 
its adjudication of significant economic disputes with high financial and 
political stakes.25 One possible solution—where jurisdictional and 
choice-of-law rules permit—is to foster proper application of a nation’s 
regulatory law in courts other than those of the home forum where the 
law originates. The Russian RICO dispute is arguably a case-in-point. 
Such “legal tourism”—where plaintiffs seek application of a foreign  
regulation in their domestic courts—is likely to grow in the coming  
decades.26 The Russian RICO case’s legal nuances and implications are 
important factors in considering whether the U.S. judiciary, or Congress, 
as a matter of policy, should recognize similar claims in the future. 
The Russian RICO case settled on October 22, 2009, for $14 million,27 
but despite the settlement, the case still sets a precedent in that it is likely 
to spur similar lawsuits abroad. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ litigation strategy 
has permanently altered the “legal ontology” of transnational litigation, 
and this means U.S. courts will need to articulate a legal position in re-
sponse. Had a money judgment actually been awarded—or, if such a 
judgment is awarded in the future—the judgment creditor would likely 
seek to enforce the judgment in a recognition action in the United 
States.28 The U.S. courts will eventually face a dilemma: they may either 
                                                                                                             
 23. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 251 
 24. See id. at 267–68. 
 25. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 272 (making a similar argument only with re-
spect to litigation in U.S. courts); cf. Christopher A. Whytock, Litigation, Arbitration, 
and the Transnational Shadow of the Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 449, 452 (2008). 
“Transnational regulatory cases [have been criticized for] . . . [shifting] power to the 
courts of particular countries in a way that . . . infringe[s] the sovereignty of other coun-
tries. Because the regulatory cases apply domestic rather than international law, they are 
also criticized as vehicles for the illegitimate application of national law to foreign con-
duct.” Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 272. It is noteworthy that the Russian RICO case 
stands squarely to face this criticism head on. 
 26. Cf. Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 252–53 (discussing relevance and prevalence of 
transnational regulatory litigation). 
 27. Joint Press Release, Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation & Bank 
of New York Mellon Corporation, Litigation Settlement (Oct. 22, 2009), http://www. 
bnymellon.com/pressreleases/2009/pdf /pr102209.pdf. 
 28. A recognition action is filed in a court as a first step in a judgment enforcement 
process. See generally Katherine R. Miller, Playground Politics: Assessing the Wisdom of 
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dismiss such recognition actions, rejecting the notion that a foreign plain-
tiff may bring a civil RICO claim in its home forum, or, in the spirit of 
international comity,29 they may embrace the new development in 
“transnational regulatory”30 litigation and recognize the foreign court’s 
judgment. If or when a U.S. court chooses to recognize a foreign court’s 
civil RICO judgment, that court will have to account for the judgment’s 
novel element, namely the application of civil RICO by a foreign forum. 
This Note will examine a hypothetical action for recognition in U.S. 
courts and the various threshold issues that would arise.31 Essentially, I 
will discuss the ways in which a U.S. court should analyze these nuanced 
issues under existing precedent. I will argue that U.S. courts—especially 
in the Russian RICO case scenario—may recognize a foreign money 
judgment rendered abroad under civil RICO because nothing in the Rus-
sian case triggers mandatory nonrecognition32 under the Recognition 
Act.33 Thereafter, I will conclude that, as a matter of sound legal policy,34 
                                                                                                             
Writing a Reciprocity Requirement Into U.S. International Recognition and Enforcement 
Law, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 239, 281 (2004). 
 29. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (finding that in order for U.S. 
courts to extend comity to a foreign judgment, courts of that foreign nation must recipro-
cate by extending comity to U.S. judgments). 
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one 
hand, nor a mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws. 
Id. But cf. Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
563 (2000) (arguing that the significance of international comity is diminishing). See 
generally Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 37 (1991) 
(giving historical and comparative background on comity in international law and sug-
gesting that the U.S.S.R., as a civil code jurisdiction, generally rejected the notion of 
comity). 
 30. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278. In fact, the FCS claim is the type that has 
been categorized as a “transnational regulatory” claim because collection of lost tax reve-
nue falls within the ambit of economic regulation. See id. at 278–80. 
 31. For the purpose of the analysis herein, I will assume that FCS succeeded on the 
merits in the Moscow Arbitrazh Court and will now attempt to have the judgment recog-
nized in a U.S. court. 
 32. See generally Joseph J. Simeone, The Recognition and Enforceability of Foreign 
Country Judgments, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 341, 362 (1993); Violeta I. Balan, Comment, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States: The Need for 
Federal Legislation, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 229, 230–34 (2003) (discussing the various 
aspects of foreign money judgment recognition analysis). 
 33. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 Part II U.L.A. 155 
(2005) [hereinafter RECOGNITION ACT]. 
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U.S. courts should recognize a hypothetical Russian RICO judgment. 
Finally, in light of the Russian RICO case offering a “new paradigm” in 
“transnational regulatory” litigation,35 I will propose a modification to 
the recognition analysis that will account for issues presented should a 
foreign court apply U.S. law against an American defendant. According-
ly, Part I will lay out the background of the Russian Court case as well as 
the RICO Act in general. Part II will discuss the current recognition re-
gime. Part III will explain why civil RICO may be applied by a foreign 
court. Part IV will discuss the strongest available defenses against recog-
nition of a hypothetical Russian RICO case judgment in the United 
States. And, finally, Part V will propose a modification to the recognition 
analysis under the Recognition Act. 
I. THE FACTS AND THE LAW 
A. The Facts 
Let us start from the beginning—the early 1990s. BONY first estab-
lished its operations in Eastern Europe36 and opened a branch in Moscow 
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.37 At that time, BONY be-
came the leading U.S. bank in Russia in terms of its business volume 
with Russian banks and citizens.38 Lucy Edwards, a Russian expatriate, 
worked for BONY as a midlevel bank official during the 1990s.39  
Together with her husband, Peter Berlin, and another junior BONY  
employee, Edwards used BONY accounts and software to arrange  
unlicensed wire transfers totaling nearly $7.5 billion from Russia to the 
U.S. over the course of three years.40 
                                                                                                             
 34. See Simeone, supra note 32, at 362; Balan, supra note 32, at 230–34. See gener-
ally RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL W. GORDON, & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, TRADE & ECONOMIC RELATIONS 730 (2005) 
(discussing the framework for recognition of foreign money judgments in the U.S.). 
 35. Cf. Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278. 
 36. See generally Parloff, supra note 2; Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra 
note 5, at 1. 
 37. See generally Parloff, supra note 2 (discussing the background facts of the Rus-
sian Court case). 
 38. Final Brief of the Russia’s FCS at para. 33, available at http://www. 
russianbanksuit.com/documents/FinalBrief.pdf [hereinafter The Final Brief] (last visited 
Oct 9, 2009). 
 39. Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra note 5, at 1. 
 40. Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra note 5, at 1; The Final Brief, supra 
note 38, at para. 35. 
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In 1996, Berlin, claiming to run an import-export business, opened  
accounts at a BONY branch in Manhattan.41 Subsequent investigation 
revealed42 that the accounts were used in Russia to perform illicit money 
transfers43 by another Russian bank’s customers, some of whom carried 
“machine guns.”44 The investigation showed that, to hide her scheme 
from the BONY officials, Edwards “bribed a subordinate and falsified 
records.”45 Further, to enable the transfers, Edwards supplied Berlin with 
BONY’s proprietary software that enabled them to conceal the wire 
transfers from BONY’s auditors.46 In compensation for the transfers, the 
couple was paid $1.8 million.47 As a result of the BONY employees’ 
conduct, Russia suffered massive capital flight during the 1990’s that 
further exacerbated Russia’s economic crisis at the time.48 The FBI  
began its investigation in 1999.49 The scope and breadth of the fraud was 
so wide that it became the subject of the testimony of BONY’s CEO be-
fore the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services.50 
In February 2000, Berlin and Edwards pled guilty to “conspiring to  
violate U.S. laws.”51 The couple also “‘pled guilty to, among other 
things, conspiracy to . . . promote wire fraud,’ and they admitted that 
their accounts were used ‘among other things, to launder money.’”52 In 
November 2005, BONY entered into a nonprosecution agreement with 
the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.53 BONY 
agreed to pay a $14 million fine and to implement “new anti-money-
                                                                                                             
 41. Parloff, supra note 2, at 130. 
 42. See Non-prosecution Agreement Between the Bank of New York and the U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York ¶ 2, 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/bankofnewyork.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 
2008) [hereinafter Non-prosecution Agreement] (where BONY “accept[ed] and acknowl-
edge[ed] responsibility for the conduct of its employees”). 
 43. Parloff, supra note 2, at 130. 
 44. Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 45. Parloff, supra note 2, at 129. 
 46. See generally Parloff, supra note 2; Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 47. See generally Parloff, supra note 2; Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 48. G. Robert Blakey & Alan Dershowitz, Podcast: Key Issues Discussed on July 16, 
2008 Conference Call, held by Bank of New York’s Money Laundering Suit: What You 
Need to Know, (July 16, 2008), http://www.russianbanksuit.com/podcasts.html. 
 49. See Parloff, supra note 2. 
 50. See Committee Hearing on Russian Money Laundering, supra note 2. 
 51. Parloff, supra note 2, at 131; Russian Money Launderers Plead Guilty, BBC, Feb. 
16, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/645717.stm. 
 52. Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 53. Goldhaber, supra note 2; see Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 42. 
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laundering policies and procedures, including the creation of a new com-
pliance position.”54 
B. The Litigation 
On June 30, 2008, BONY’s attorneys filed a motion in the Moscow 
Arbitrazh court to dismiss the FCS suit on grounds that a Russian trial 
court may not apply civil RICO to this case.55 The judge56 requested 
briefs on the issue from both sides.57 A month later, on July 28, the Court 
denied the motion and decided to proceed under civil RICO.58 Then, pre-
trial hearings began in Moscow at the end of October.59 On October 6, 
the court granted the FCS’s request for a continuance and stayed the  
action six weeks.60 And thereafter, the case was adjourned until June 10, 
2009 pending settlement agreement.61 Even now that the case has settled, 
the legal implications of the lawsuit remain significant, but we are left to 
ponder what could have been. If BONY had lost at trial, it could have 
pursued three levels of appeal: the appellate arbitrazh courts, the federal 
circuit arbitrazh courts, and the Supreme Arbitrazh Court.62 As one 
                                                                                                             
 54. Goldhaber, supra note 2; cf. Jeannie Shawl, Bank of New York Settles Fraud, 
Money Laundering Charges, JURIST, Nov. 9, 2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/ 
2005/11/bank-of-new-york-settles-fraud-money.php (referring to federal prosecutors’ 
announcement that BONY will pay $38 million: $26 million to the federal government 
and $12 million to the fraud victims). 
 55. Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 56. One common procedural feature among a common and civil law systems is that, 
in both, judges decide questions of law. See SOFIE GEEROMS, FOREIGN LAW IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 13 (James J. Fawcett ed., 2004). One significant 
difference, however, is that in a common law system, juries decide questions of fact. See 
id. In most civil law systems, judges decide questions of fact. See id. 
 57. Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
 58. See Montgomery, supra note 2. Moscow Arbitrazh Court, being a court of first 
instance, does not have a website. At the time of this writing, there are no public docu-
ments or press releases available from the governmental source in Russian. Thus, I must 
rely primarily upon non-Russian sources. It is unclear whether this leaves us with a more, 
or less, objective view of the case. 
 59. Parloff, supra note 2, at 135. “If the case cannot be resolved through governmen-
tal channels, however, the bank may have no choice but to settle rather than risk litigating 
in a forum that appears to lack both the expertise and independence to render an impartial 
result . . . .” Id. at 135. 
 60. Bank of New York Money Laundering Suit: What You Need to Know, Case 
Chronology, http://www.russianbanksuit.com/chronology.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009). 
 61. See Will Bland, Russian Judge Adjourns BONY Suit, Seeks Deal, WALL ST. J., 
May 28, 2009, at C4. 
 62. Goldhaber, supra note 2. 
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commentator had aptly put it: “If at the end of the day a Russian judg-
ment still stands, a worldwide war would begin over its enforcement.”63 
Several commentators have raised the obvious question: why was this 
case not being brought in the U.S.?64 Could the FCS’s claim be res judi-
cata? In Pavlov v. Bank of New York, 65 private Russian parties brought a 
civil RICO claim arising out of the same core facts.66 In Pavlov, depo-
sitors of another Russian bank67 sued BONY to recover damages that 
were allegedly caused by unauthorized money transfers and money  
laundering that were the subject of the FBI’s investigation of BONY.68 
The Pavlov plaintiffs claimed that the illicit money transfers—those at 
the heart of the FCS’s claim—caused their bank’s insolvency and thus 
caused them to lose their deposits.69 United States District Judge Lewis 
Kaplan, in a memorandum opinion, dismissed the claim on forum non 
conveniens grounds.70 Nowhere in his decision did Judge Kaplan con-
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.; see Parloff, supra note 2, at 132. 
 65. Pavlov v. Bank of New York, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(finding that the complaint failed to state a RICO claim because it did not allege an enter-
prise extending beyond the objectives of the racketeering acts charged or a structural 
hierarchy, and dismissing the two remaining plaintiffs’ state law claims for forum non 
conveniens), vacated, 25 F. App’x 70 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacating the district court’s deci-
sion, but disagreeing only with the Court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ RICO claim for failure 
to adequately plead a RICO enterprise, and remanding for consideration of other bases 
for dismissal), remanded to No. 99 Civ. 10347, 2002 WL 31324097 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(finding plaintiffs in default and dismissing with prejudice for lack of prosecution). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 428–29. 
 69. Id. at 426. 
 70. Id. at 428–29. 
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template that the FCS, with the help of its U.S. lawyers,71 would bring a 
civil RICO claim in Russia arising out of Pavlov’s same core facts.72 
The Pavlov decision, however, is unlikely to preclude the FCS’s cur-
rent claim from U.S. courts because the FCS and the Pavlov plaintiffs are 
not in privity. 73 The FCS is a sovereign, while the Pavlov plaintiffs are 
private parties. The more likely reason that the case was not brought in 
the U.S. was that the FCS acts as a foreign sovereign that was arguably 
seeking to recover lost tax revenue.74 As a foreign sovereign, the FCS 
may be barred from bringing a civil RICO claim in U.S. courts because 
of the “revenue rule.”75 The revenue rule is not categorical and is not a 
clear cut bar for the purposes of judgment recognition because of the 
rule’s fragile doctrinal and policy foundations. In light of the novel post-
                                                                                                             
 71. The U.S. lawyers lined up a phalanx of prominent U.S. academics as expert wit-
nesses to the Moscow Arbitrazh Court on the issue whether it may apply civil RICO. 
Goldhaber, supra note 2. One of them was Robert Blakey, one of the RICO statute’s 
principal drafters, who testified on behalf of Russian FCS that it would not be inconsis-
tent with the Congressional intent for a foreign court to apply civil RICO. The Final 
Brief, supra note 38, at para. 87, 90. Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard Law School Professor 
and a leading expert on civil RICO, also testified for the Russian FCS that, inter alia, 
BONY is not prejudiced to being held accountable under civil RICO as it is a U.S. corpo-
ration that must conform to U.S. laws. Id. at para. 100. Also, the Honorable Judge George 
Pratt, who served as a U.S. District Judge and then sat on the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Second Circuit until 1995, interpreted the civil RICO and its elements for 
the Moscow Arbitrazh Court. Id. at para. 108. 
 72. See Pavlov, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 435–38. Moreover, in ruling on the motion for 
forum non conveniens, the Court relied on the assumption that the plaintiff’s claim would 
be adjudicated under Russian law. Id. For a discussion of the consequences of dismissal 
based on forum non conveniens, see Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 
944 (1st Cir. 1991) and Contact Lumber Co. v. P.T. Moges Shipping Co., Ltd., 918 F.2d 
1446, 1446 (9th Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Zen-Noh Grain Corp. v. M/V Theogennitor, No. 
Civ.A. 97-543, 2002 WL 31886745, at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 18, 2002) (noting that 
“[d]ismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens is appropriate even though it may 
result in a foreign jurisdiction applying American law.”). 
 73. In Pavlov, the plaintiff’s claims were eventually dismissed with prejudice for lack 
of prosecution. Pavlov v. Bank of New York, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10347, 2002 WL 
31324097 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2002). While dismissal with prejudice is considered to have 
res judicata effect, the parties must be identical or in privity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 19–20 (1982). 
 74. See Goldhaber, supra note 2. See generally Farnam, supra note 16 (providing a 
thorough discussion of lost revenue claims). 
 75. See Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 
103 (2d Cir. 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987). 
“The courts recognized the discretionary nature of the rule, acknowledging that U.S. 
courts can choose, in light of the need for international comity and cooperation between 
countries, to give effect to a foreign claim.” Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 279. 
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ure of the Russian RICO case, however, the preliminary issue for recogni-
tion is whether a Russian court may apply civil RICO. 
C. Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act 
Congress enacted RICO76 in 1970 as part of an effort to improve law 
enforcement’s ability to prosecute organized crime.77 RICO is, at heart, a 
criminal statute.78 If found guilty of “racketeering,” defendants can re-
ceive lengthy prison sentences and be subject to large fines.79 But RICO 
also contains a civil component.80 While civil RICO provides for treble 
damages81 under the statute’s forfeiture provision, defendants can also be 
forced to disgorge any property acquired through the predicate illegal 
activity.82 In enacting this “private attorney general” mechanism, Con-
gress evidently intended to allow private plaintiffs to fully recover losses 
caused by racketeering; in doing so, Congress sought RICO to function 
as a deterrent.83 
                                                                                                             
 76. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006). 
 77. RICO was part of the Organized Crime Control Act. Organized Crime Control 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 
(2006)). 
 78. “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act . . . [was] one of the ‘new 
remedies’ to deal with organized crime in the United States, a ‘highly sophisticated,  
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from Ameri-
ca’s economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption.’” 
Judith A. Morse, Note, Treble Damages under Rico: Characterization and Computation, 
61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 526 (1986) (quoting Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Statement of Findings and Purpose)). 
 79. Id. at 526. The essential elements of a civil RICO action are: (a) a pattern of rack-
eteering activity; (b) the existence of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or 
foreign commerce; (c) a nexus between the pattern of racketeering activity and the enter-
prise; and (d) a resulting injury to the plaintiff’s business or property. See id. 
 80. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). 
 81. Id. “Like compensatory damages, treble damages are mandatory once the victim 
establishes liability and the extent of the harm [and] . . . [u]nlike punitive damages, treble 
damages are not discretionary either in award or amount . . . .” Morse, supra note 78, at 
528. 
 82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). 
 83. “The appeal of civil RICO is obvious . . . . [it] entitles a successful plaintiff to 
treble damages as well as attorneys’ fees. As a result, it provides a powerful litigation 
weapon and a strong lever in settlement negotiations.” Robert M. Jarvis, The Use of Civil 
Rico in International Arbitration: Some Thoughts after Shearson/American Express v. 
Mcmahon, 1 TRANSNAT’L LAW 1, 6 (1988). “[S]tatutory language and statutory construc-
tion . . . reflect Congress’ intent that RICO’s treble damage provision serve broad re-
medial purposes.” Morse, supra note 78, at 530. 
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Civil RICO gained wide use during 1980’s.84 Some have criticized the 
use of the statute to pursue conduct that is arguably less extreme than the 
era’s typical criminal “racketeering,” which served as the impetus for the 
statute and which RICO’s broad provisions were designed to combat.85 
The Supreme Court, however, has stated that RICO is to “be liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”86 The Court noted in 1981 
that RICO “has become a tool for everyday fraud cases brought against 
‘respected and legitimate’ enterprises.”87 In sum, civil RICO is a power-
ful litigation tool in the hands of a resourceful plaintiff. 
While RICO permits foreign governments88 to recover losses resulting 
from racketeering activity, Congress did not consider at the time of 
enactment whether RICO could be applied by a foreign court.89 Con-
gress’s sole focus was merely to enact a law to be applied, first and 
foremost, by U.S. courts to combat organized crime domestically.90 
There is simply no evidence of Congressional intent as to civil RICO’s 
effect or applicability abroad beyond what Congress intended to effec-
                                                                                                             
 84. Jarvis, supra note 83, at 6 (recounting that “civil plaintiffs started to include 
RICO counts in their suits, often accompanied by fraud and antitrust claims”). 
 85. See generally O’SULLIVAN, supra note 14, at 657–58. In enacting RICO, the “leg-
islature was . . . addressing . . . pervasive public interest [in a governmental response] to 
unprecedented domestic strife and violence, [thus] Congress sought to provide federal 
law enforcement officials with a weapon against organized crime.” Jarvis, supra note 83, 
at 5. 
 86. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985). In Sedima, a Belgian 
corporation filed a civil RICO claim against an American corporation based on mail and 
wire fraud. Id. at 483–84. The Sedima court also stated that a civil RICO claim does not 
require a finding of a predicate criminal act. Id. at 485. 
 87. Id. at 499; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981) (holding 
that both legitimate and illegitimate businesses could be prosecuted under civil RICO). 
 88. RICO defines a person as “any . . . entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial 
interest in property.” 18 U.S.C. §1961(3) (2006). Thus, “a foreign government is consi-
dered a person for the purposes of the RICO statute, allowing foreign governments to file 
RICO claims,” Farnam, supra note 16, at 846 (citing Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 
1358 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 316 (7th Cir. 
1985) (holding that state governmental units can sue under RICO)). 
 89. But RICO does not contain a mandatory provision requiring litigation in U.S. 
courts. Cf. Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo., Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1987) (“A 
review of the legislative history of RICO, however, discloses no mandate that the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens should not apply[.]”); see also Gemini Capital Group, Inc. 
v. YAP Fishing Corp., 150 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a RICO action 
“does not implicate any United States law which mandates venue in the United States 
district courts.”). In Transunion, the court affirmed dismissal of a civil RICO claim even 
though the Philippine court might apply civil RICO law. Transunion Corp., 811 F.2d at 
130. 
 90. See generally O’SULLIVAN, supra note 14, at 657–58. 
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tuate on the domestic front.91 But criminal laws are public laws and may 
only be enforced by the enacting sovereign and applied only by its 
courts, never by a foreign judiciary.92 Importantly, while RICO is a crim-
inal law, and thus public, RICO’s civil component may be conceptua-
lized as a quasi-public law93 because it provides a private cause of action 
based on a criminal violation of public law.94 
The key to solving the Russian Court case puzzle is to delineate how a 
potential plaintiff obtains a cause of action under civil RICO. The BONY 
employees’ criminal conduct was imputed to BONY in the course of the 
DOJ white-collar crime investigation that resulted in a nonprosecution 
agreement where BONY admitted responsibility for its conduct.95 The 
FCS’s attorneys, thus, argued that the Moscow Arbitrazh Court would 
not need to resolve whether a predicate criminal violation took place for 
two reasons. First, Lucy Edwards, BONY’s employee, was convicted in 
federal court on July 26, 2006, and, second, BONY has admitted wrong-
doing in its nonprosecution agreement with the DOJ.96 The predicate  
violation was the U.S. money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, 
which is a valid predicate act under RICO.97 Because a corporation is a 
legal fiction that can only act through its employees, BONY is vicariously 
liable for Edwards’ conduct.98 Thus, the Moscow Arbitrazh court’s task 
                                                                                                             
 91. See id. 
 92. Jarvis, supra note 83, at 16 n. 64. In the United States, the ban on enforcing penal 
legislation can be traced to The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), in which Chief 
Justice Marshall held that “[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another. . 
. .” Id. at 123. The Antelope involved a question whether slaves on ships seized by the 
United States should be returned to Spanish and Portuguese slave traders. The Antelope, 
23 U.S. 66. The Court rejected the argument that it should enforce the Spanish and Portu-
guese laws against the slave trade. See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Ta-
boo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 165 (2002). 
 93. See generally Dodge, supra note 92, at 161 (arguing that “nations should break 
the public law taboo because cooperation in the enforcement of public law would be mu-
tually beneficial.”). 
 94. Cf. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485 (1985). “Supreme Court in 
Sedima recognized that civil RICO, despite being part of a comprehensive criminal  
statute, is an independent civil cause of action.” Jarvis, supra note 83, at 15. 
 95. See Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 42. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006). 
 98. See Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products, 974 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1992). Ninth Circuit 
stated with respect to respondeat superior liability for violations of §1962(c): 
We hold that an employer that is benefited by its employee or agent’s viola-
tions of section 1962(c) may be held liable under the doctrines of respondeat 
superior and agency when the employer is distinct from the enterprise. Corpo-
rations and other employers that have benefited from their employees or 
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would be simplified. It would not need to interpret the money laundering 
statute, nor would it need to find BONY guilty under U.S. criminal law. 
The predicate investigation and conviction was conducted in the U.S., 
where it belonged. The genius of the FCS attorney’s innovative strategy 
was perhaps that, once they convinced the Moscow Arbitrazh court that 
it may do so, the court would have needed only to interpret and apply 
civil RICO to award civil damages, without meddling in the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system. 
Because its employees’—and, thus, BONY’s—“racketeering activity” 
allegedly caused damage in Russia, a Russian plaintiff (here the FCS) 
has a cause of action under civil RICO.99 On the one hand, the fact that 
the FCS is seeking remedy for allegedly unpaid customs duties places the 
Russian lawsuit among the “garden variety” civil RICO claims for lost 
revenue that are regularly brought in the U.S.100 On the other hand, FCS 
and its attorney were asking for a civil remedy in the form of treble dam-
ages pursuant to civil RICO. In that sense, they were not looking to re-
cover unpaid duties or taxes, but simply seeking damages for the predi-
cate wrongful conduct. This, the attorneys argue, places their civil RICO 
claim outside the typical revenue claims and would thus make the reve-
nue rule inapplicable. Nevertheless, the Russian RICO case raises  
numerous issues for the purposes of recognition in the U.S. 
II. RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE U.S. 
The United States is not a party to any bilateral or multilateral treaty on 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.101 Furthermore, there 
is no national, uniform approach to recognition and enforcement of for-
                                                                                                             
agents’ RICO violations will be forced to compensate the victims of racketeer-
ing activity. Respondeat superior and agency liability will encourage employers 
to monitor more closely the activities of their employees and agents to ensure 
that these agents are not involved in racketeering activities. Thus, respondeat 
superior liability furthers both the compensatory and deterrent goals of the 
RICO statute. 
Brady v. Dairy Fresh Products, 974 F.2d at 1154–55. 
 99. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278. See generally Farnam, supra note 16 (dis-
cussing the lost revenue claims). 
 100. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278. 
 101. See Simeone, supra note 32, at 362 (discussing the unsuccessful attempt of the 
United States and United Kingdom to negotiate a bilateral treaty in the 1970s); Balan, 
supra note 32, at 230 (noting that, while “other countries have entered into such reciproc-
al agreements,” the U.S remains an outsider). Other countries are reluctant to enforce 
U.S. jury awards, which they consider to be “exuberant.” Simeone, supra note 32, at 362. 
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eign judgments in the U.S.102 Because recognition actions come from 
abroad, they must be filed in federal district courts under diversity juris-
diction.103 The Erie doctrine104 has led federal courts to conclude that 
state law governs judgment recognition in diversity cases.105 As a result, 
federal courts around the country apply standards from one of the follow-
ing sources:106 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act107 
(“Recognition Act”) or “a similar statute”;108 Restatement (Third) of  
Foreign Relations Law;109 “prior state court decisions setting forth local 
common law rules”;110 or “prior federal court decisions determining as 
best as possible the law the state court would have applied if it had been 
faced with the same issue.”111 The New York recognition statute reflects 
the common array of doctrinal principles in the Recognition Act, which 
in turn mirrors the Restatement.112 Any recognition discussion, however, 
must begin with the common law antecedent to the modern law of recog-
nition. 
A. The Rule Based on Comity: Hilton v. Guyot 
Originally, the U.S. inherited the old English common law rule that a 
foreign money judgment was only “prima facie evidence of the matter 
                                                                                                             
 102. Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign-Money Judgments in the United States: 
In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 257 
(1991) (explaining that Congress has not passed a statute and that the federal courts have 
yet to find common ground, and arguing further that the judiciary should adopt a uniform 
rule for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments). 
 103. Id. at 262. “Diversity jurisdiction is founded on the article III jurisdiction of the 
federal courts, U.S. CONST. art. III, and is statutorily prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 
(1988) . . . .” Id. at 262 n.32. 
 104. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938). 
 105. See Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1003–04 
(5th Cir. 1990); Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Somportex, Ltd. v. 
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 1971); Toronto-Dominion 
Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1011–12 (E.D. Ark. 1973). 
 106. Brand, supra note 102, at 262 (listing possible sources in an effort to demonstrate 
lack of uniformity as a premise for an argument that the judiciary should prescribe a uni-
form standard). 
 107. RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 33. The Recognition Act was proposed because 
“[c]odification by a state of its rules on the recognition of money judgments rendered in a 
foreign court will make it more likely that judgments rendered in the state will be recog-
nized abroad.” Id. at prefatory note. 
 108. Brand, supra note 102, at 262. 
 109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–482 (1987). 
 110. Brand, supra note 102, at 262. 
 111. Id. 
 112. N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301–05 (Consol. 2004). 
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decided.”113 Under this rule a foreign judgment was “not conclusive of 
the merits of the dispute between the parties”114 and, thus, was likely to 
be subject to a thorough review.115 In 1895, the Supreme Court rejected 
the English rule in an influential case Hilton v. Guyot.116 The Hilton 
Court adopted a rule based on comity.117 In lowering the bar to recogni-
tion, the Hilton decision afforded deference to a foreign judgment.118 But 
it required further analysis of a number of the judgment’s aspects.119 
Specifically, the foreign court rendering the judgment must have had 
jurisdiction over the cause of action and the judgment “must have been 
rendered . . . upon regular proceedings and due notice”120 by a court 
within a “system of jurisprudence” that provides an “impartial adminis-
tration of justice.”121 The Hilton Court required absence of prejudice or 
fraud in the proceedings, as well as in the court and in the system of 
laws.122 The Court held that in the absence of any other “special reason,” 
if the judgment satisfied the above criteria, the merits of the case should 
not be tried again “upon the mere assertion”123 by a defendant that the 
original “judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.”124 
In order to approach the discussion of the Russian RICO case objec-
tively, it is necessary to dispel the pervasive perception of Russian 
courts’ partiality, which is contrary to the Hilton “impartiality” require-
ment. Frequently, when a case is heading to a court in Russia, litigants 
and non-litigants with vested interests question the forum’s integrity by 
raising issues of partiality or political favoritism in order to frustrate the 
litigation.125 Not surprisingly, the party that raises the issue is usually the 
                                                                                                             
 113. See FOLSOM, GORDON, & SPANOGLE, JR., supra note 34, at 730. 
 114. Balan, supra note 32, at 235 (citing RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE 
GORDON, & JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 1109 (2d 
ed. 2001)). 
 115. FOLSOM, GORDON, SPANOGLE, JR., supra note 34, at 730. 
 116. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 116 (1895). 
 117. Id. at 170; see also FOLSOM, GORDON, SPANOGLE, JR., supra note 34, at 730. 
 118. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 158. 
 119. Id. at 163–64. 
 120. Id. at 166–67. 
 121. Id. at 158. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. For example, on October 17, 2008, the Moscow Arbitrazh Court, the venue for 
the FCS’s claim, “overturned most of [the] Russian government’s tax claims against the 
British Council, the British government’s cultural relations arm.” Ximena Marinero, Rus-
sia Arbitration Court Rules Most Tax Claims Against British Council Unlawful, JURIST, 
Oct. 18, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/10/russia-arbitration-court-rules-
most-tax.php. This dispute over unpaid taxes was highly publicized and took place in the 
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party that is likely to benefit from being in a forum other than Russia. 
For example, the Russian plaintiffs in Pavlov, in resisting BONY’s  
motion for forum non conveniens, claimed that Russia would not be an 
appropriate forum because its courts are believed to be prone to partiali-
ty.126 Nevertheless, BONY persisted with its forum non conveniens  
motion despite Russian plaintiffs’ allegation of partiality in the Russian 
forum,127 which would, if it were true, adversely affect BONY as a  
foreign litigant. As a result, BONY would now be unlikely to be able to 
persuade a U.S. court that a Russian judgment should not be recog-
nized128 on grounds of Russian courts’ alleged partiality.129 While the 
inference here is simple, it is an important one: litigants’ allegations of a 
Russian forum’s inadequacy due to partiality130 of the Russian judi-
                                                                                                             
context of a diplomatic standoff between Russia and Great Britain. Id. It appears that the 
Moscow Arbitrazh court has thwarted the Kremlin’s attempt to corner the British Coun-
sel. This is indicative of Russia’s courts’ burgeoning independence, assertiveness, and 
commitment to rule of law. 
 126. See Pavlov v. Bank of New York, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). As matter of speculation, if a Russian court displayed bias against a party—as it 
may have during the Soviet era that was marred by the State control over the judiciary—
it would likely be against a foreign party, not its national. 
 127. Id. at 435. “In view of BNY[M]’s staunch assertion here that the Russian legal 
system provides an adequate alternative forum, it quite likely would be estopped to 
mount such a challenge to a Russian money judgment in this case. Moreover, at least one 
U.S. court has recognized and enforced a Russian custody decree.” Id. at 435. 
 128. On the other hand, the Russian Court case’s press coverage makes it clear that, to 
assuage its shareholders, BONY was attempting to sway the “proverbial jury in the court 
of public opinion.” Claiming to be a victim of political influence and corruption in the 
Russian judiciary, BONY attempted to discredit the case in the press, a litigation tactic 
equally utilized by domestic litigants. BONY argued that the courts’ partiality is likely to 
impede equitable resolution on the merits. Parloff, supra note 2, at 127; Key Facts, supra 
note 5, at 3; see also Press Release, Bank of New York Mellon, The Fundamental Flaws 
in the Federal Customs Service’s Case, http://www.bnymellon.com/russiacase/ 
rebuttal.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). This position, however, is contrary to the one 
BONY had taken on a motion for forum non conveniens in Pavlov. See supra text ac-
companying notes 72–73. 
 129. “Parties may seek recusal of judges . . . on several grounds, primarily relating to 
partiality.” Glenn P. Hendrix, Business Litigation and Arbitration in Russia, 31 INT’L 
LAW. 1075 (1997), reprinted in A LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA & THE 
FORMER REPUBLICS OF THE U.S.S.R. 135, 163 (Aviva Yakren ed., 2000) (updating origi-
nal article). Unless BONY raises the issue of partiality at trial in Russia, it should be 
precluded from challenging a recognition action on the same grounds. 
 130. Moreover, commentators have described Russia’s arbitrazh courts as a place 
where the State’s influence is no longer as palpable as it was during the Soviet era. See 
generally Kathryn Hendley, Remaking an Institution: The Transition in Russia from State 
Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh Courts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 93 (1998) (discussing the transition 
of the arbitrazh courts toward an independent judiciary). 
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ciary131 must be viewed skeptically in light of a litigant’s posture at  
trial.132 
B. Normative Standards in the Recognition Act and the Restatement 
It is noteworthy that the Pavlov court recognized that, had the plaintiffs 
sued BONY in Russia, a Russian judgment would be subject to recogni-
tion proceedings in the U.S. In response to plaintiffs’ concern about hav-
ing to re-litigate a substantial portion of a judgment from a Russian 
court, the Pavlov court stated: 
The Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 
which has been adopted in New York, insofar as it is relevant here, 
would permit a court to refuse enforcement to a Russian money judg-
ment only if it concluded that the Russian legal system “does not pro-
vide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements 
of due process of law . . .133 
The Recognition Act134 and Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law135 are the prevailing sources of normative principles and criteria for 
judgment recognition in a majority of American jurisdictions.136 The 
                                                                                                             
 131. Cf. Dmitry Dyakin & Alexander Vaneev, New Perspectives for Business Litiga-
tion in Russia, THE EUROPEAN LAWYER, Sept. 2007, at 44, 44–45. Dyakin and Vaneev 
note: 
The effectiveness of arbitrazh courts in Russia has grown. . . . Numerous ef-
forts were made in order to create uniformity in application of law. Since 2000, 
the Supreme Arbitrazh Court of the Russian Federation has introduced a num-
ber of rulings and governing interpretations aimed at stabilisation of the judicial 
practice. These clarifications particularly have to do with such essential aspects 
of commercial relationship as protection of shareholders rights, turnover of se-
curities, performance of insurance contracts, state guarantees for foreign inves-
tors, disputes with state and state-owned enterprises, bankruptcy procedures, 
and a huge variety of tax issues. 
Id. 
 132. Historically, “arbitrazh was relatively free of corruption . . . because the stakes in 
an economic dispute between state-owned enterprise[s] were generally lower than . . . in 
criminal cases,” Hendrix, supra note 129, at 153. 
 133. See Pavlov v. Bank of New York, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 426, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 134. See RECOGNITION ACT § 1(2), supra note 33. 
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–482 (1987). 
 136. See Brand, supra note 102, at 268 (juxtaposing each criterion in both sources and 
finding merely “cosmetic” differences between the Recognition Act and the Restate-
ment). Brand continues: 
[T]here are only two significant differences between the Recognition Act and 
the Restatement. Whereas the Act treats lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a 
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Recognition Act and the Restatement are also substantially similar.137 In 
an action for recognition, U.S. courts focus on a common array of  
issues138 entailing the presence or absence of the following elements: 
finality and conclusiveness of the judgment;139 due process;140 in pers-
onam and in rem jurisdiction;141 subject matter jurisdiction;142 notice and 
opportunity to be heard;143 fraud;144 public policy;145 inconsistent judg-
                                                                                                             
mandatory ground for nonrecognition, it is only a discretionary ground under 
the Restatement rule. In addition, the Act includes a limited forum non conve-
niens ground in its list of discretionary grounds for nonrecognition. 
Id. 
 137. See id. Recognition is conceptually and procedurally different from enforceabili-
ty—a judgment must first be recognized by U.S. courts in order to be enforced. Enfor-
ceability is regulated by the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, which deals mainly 
with the procedure, or the “how,” for judgment collection. See id. 
 138. Id. at 269. 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. e. “[A] judgment 
at law is not a final judgment if further judicial action by the court rendering the judg-
ment is required to determine the matter litigated.” RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 41 
cmt. a (1942). 
 140. RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a), supra note 33. “[A] mere difference in the procedural 
system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition. A case of serious injustice must be 
involved.” Id. “The . . . due process [issue] has arisen principally in the context of discus-
sions of personal jurisdiction. United States courts apply United States concepts of due 
process developed in International Shoe v. Washington[, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),] and its 
progeny, rather than looking to similar concepts applicable in the foreign jurisdiction.” 
Brand, supra note 102, at 270; see CIBC Mellon Trust Co. v. Mora Hotel, 100 N.Y.2d 
215, 222 (2003) (holding that New York State law does not demand that the foreign tri-
bunal’s procedures exactly match those of New York—rather, the statute is satisfied if 
the foreign court’s procedures are compatible with the requirements of due process of 
law). 
 141. RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a), supra note 33, at 268; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(1)(b). In Hilton, the Court required that “[e]very foreign 
judgment, of whatever nature, in order to be entitled to any effect, must have been ren-
dered by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, and upon regular proceedings, and due 
notice.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166–67 (1895). 
 142. RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(3), supra note 33, at 268; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(a). Under the Restatement, lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction is a discretionary ground for non-recognition. But under the Recognition Act, 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a mandatory ground for non-recognition. Brand, 
supra note 102, at 273 n.71. 
 143. “Courts have required proper notice, generally in the form of proper service of 
process, as a prerequisite to granting recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment.” 
Brand, supra note 102, at 274. 
 144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482; see also Hilton, 
159 U.S. at 206. Generally, “fraud [is] a defense to the recognition of a foreign-nation 
judgment. . . . [A] foreign judgment can be impeached only for extrinsic fraud, which 
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ments146 or judgments contrary to party agreement;147 and convenience of 
forum.148 In the Russian Court case, public policy and due process are the 
most fertile grounds for defenses against the recognition of the Russian 
Court’s judgment. 
Judging by the history of the proceedings in Moscow and by what is-
sues BONY has raised in the court and in the press, most of the above 
criteria will not present an obstacle for the recognition of the Russian 
Court’s judgment. At this stage, BONY has not alleged any irregularities 
or foul play in the Russian RICO case, except that initially it has chal-
lenged the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,149 instinctively objected to 
                                                                                                             
deprives the aggrieved party of an adequate opportunity to present his case to the court.” 
Brand, supra note 102, at 274. 
 145. A judgment violates public policy when it “tends clearly to injure the public 
health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of the administration of the 
law, or to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal li-
berty, or of private property . . . .” Brand, supra note 102, at 276 (quoting Somportex v. 
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (1971)); see Bachchan v. India 
Abroad Publ’n, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that enforce-
ment of the English judgment violates U.S. public policy because English courts afford 
lesser protection of rights to free speech on matters of public concert than U.S courts 
under the U.S. CONST. amend. I.). 
 146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. g. “Inconsistent 
judgments may arise either in the context of two conflicting foreign judgments or of a 
foreign judgment in conflict with a judgment from another United States court.” Brand, 
supra note 102, at 276. 
 147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482 cmt. h. 
 148. The Recognition Act allows nonrecognition where the judgment is “rendered in a 
foreign country on the basis only of personal service,” and where the court “believes the 
original action should have been dismissed by the court in the foreign country on grounds 
of forum non conveniens.” Brand, supra note 102, at 277; see also RECOGNITION ACT § 4 
cmt., supra note 33, at 268–69. The forum non conveniens exception . . . is available only 
when personal jurisdiction is based solely on personal service. . . . [If] jurisdiction exists 
on any other ground, recognition may not be refused because the foreign court was a 
seriously inconvenient forum.” Brand, supra note 102, at 277. 
 149. While there is a dearth of information available, from what has surfaced in the 
U.S. press, it appears that BONY initially sought to transfer the lawsuit to a Russian Tax 
court. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 128; Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra note 5, 
at 3. At the time, that motion failed and the Arbitrazh court asserted jurisdiction over the 
case. Parloff, supra note 2, at 128. Moreover, BONY had entered appearance in several 
hearings. See Parloff, supra note 2, at 128. Because the subject matter jurisdiction is a 
discretionary nonrecognition ground, BONY would have likely lost this argument at the 
recognition stage. Moreover, regarding litigation of RICO claims in the U.S., its courts 
have held that when a RICO claim involves foreign events or conduct in a foreign coun-
try, subject matter jurisdiction to hear a RICO action exists as long as one of two alterna-
tive tests are satisfied: the conduct test or the effects test. See Madanes v. Madanes, 981 
F. Supp. 241, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also North South Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 
F.3d 1046, 1046 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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application of civil RICO and has argued that the lawsuit is improper 
because it is contrary to the U.S. public policy that a judiciary of one  
nation will not enforce public laws of another nation.150 The BONY’s 
arguments in the Moscow Arbitrazh Court foreshadowed some of the 
difficult issues that a U.S. court will have to wrestle with during a recog-
nition action. 
III. A CIVIL RICO CLAIM MAY BE FILED ABROAD 
The U.S. courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over civil RICO 
claims.151 The U.S. Supreme Court in Shearson/American Express v. 
McMahon152 has held that a foreign arbitrator may apply civil RICO in a 
foreign arbitral tribunal. This has effectively eliminated U.S. courts’  
exclusive monopoly over civil RICO. The pertinent question here is 
whether a U.S. court, in a recognition action, will tolerate a foreign 
court’s application of civil RICO against an American defendant. The 
Shearson decision at least provides an analytical point of departure. 
In June 1987, the Supreme Court in Shearson held that claims brought 
under the civil provisions of the federal RICO statute are “arbitrable re-
gardless of whether such claims arise in a domestic or international set-
ting.”153 The Court explained: 
In sum, we find no basis for concluding that Congress intended to pre-
vent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate RICO claims. [Plaintiffs] 
may effectively vindicate their RICO claim in an arbitral forum, and 
therefore there is no inherent conflict between arbitration and the purpos-
es underlying § 1964(c).154 
The Court justified its reasoning with respect to RICO’s arbitrability 
by referencing its prior decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
                                                                                                             
 150. Dodge, supra note 92, 161 (arguing that “nations should break the public law 
taboo because cooperation in the enforcement of public law would be mutually benefi-
cial.”). 
 151. For example, one prominent American practitioner and a prolific author noted 
that “[a]t least in theory, some foreign courts’ choice-of-law rules may permit or require 
application of RICO.” GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO: A DEFINITIVE GUIDE 24 n.30 (2d 
ed. 2000). This makes sense because U.S. courts may be equally required to apply Rus-
sian law if the U.S. choice-of-law rules mandate. 
 152. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 220 (1987). 
 153. Id. at 242; see also Jarvis, supra note 83, at 1. See generally Glenn P Hendrix, 
International Judicial Assistance from American Courts in Russian Litigation and Arbi-
tration Proceeding (Jun. 29, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.abanet.org/ 
intlaw/committees/disputes/litigation/Assistance.pdf. 
 154. See Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 240–41. 
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Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.155 The Court rejected the idea that “RICO 
claims are too complex to be subject to arbitration” abroad.156 The Court 
further rejected the idea that “‘overlap’ between RICO’s civil and crimi-
nal provisions renders § 1964(c) claims nonarbitrable.”157 In order to 
conceptually sever civil RICO from its penal host, the Court “rejected the 
view that § 1964(c) ‘provide[s] civil remedies [only] for offenses crimi-
nal in nature.’”158 The Court concluded that “criminal provisions of 
RICO do not preclude arbitration of bona fide civil actions brought under 
§ 1964(c).”159 As to the final obstacle, the Court disposed of the claim 
that public policy dictates nonarbitrability: 
Emphasizing . . . compensatory function . . . , Mitsubishi concluded that 
“so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statuto-
ry cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to 
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” The legislative history 
of § 1964(c) reveals the same emphasis on the remedial role of the 
treble-damages provision.160 
The Court’s decision in Mitsubishi provided the impetus for the deci-
sion in Shearson.161 In essence, the Court in Shearson transplanted its 
reasoning with respect to arbitrability under the Sherman Act in Mitsubishi 
into its justification with respect to civil RICO arbitrability abroad. Civil 
RICO’s application abroad by foreign arbitrators and its underlying poli-
cy rationale—allowing foreign plaintiffs to vindicate their rights abroad, 
in a foreign forum, under U.S. law—is best summarized in the Court’s 
following statement: 
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the ca-
pacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the 
resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties’ agreement, 
even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domes-
tic context.162 
                                                                                                             
 155. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 614 
(1985) (holding that nothing in the nature of the federal antitrust laws prohibits parties 
from agreeing to arbitrate antitrust claims arising out of international commercial transac-
tions). 
 156. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 239–40. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 161. See Jarvis, supra note 83, at 2. 
 162. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 
(1985). 
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The Court’s intuition in Mitsubishi and Shearson is further highlighted 
by the following statement: 
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be en-
couraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial 
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
courts. . . . We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, 
and resolved in our courts.163 
In sum, the Shearson decision represents the Court’s willingness to re-
linquish the U.S. courts’ monopoly over civil RICO’s application.164 Of 
course, the Shearson decision is not a green light to a foreign plaintiff to 
file a civil RICO claim in her home forum against an American defen-
dant. In other words, the Shearson decision is not a precedent on point 
that the Russian FCS, or any other foreign judgment creditor, could cite 
to argue that the Moscow Arbitrazh court, or any other non-U.S. court, 
could apply civil RICO. Shearson is distinguishable because there was a 
valid arbitration clause at the heart of the parties’ agreement.165 The 
Shearson decision was thus by and large driven by a pro-arbitration poli-
cy.166 
Significantly, however, the Shearson decision signaled the Court’s wil-
lingness to tolerate foreign arbitral awards under civil RICO and, thus, 
foreign application and interpretation of civil RICO.167 Therefore, the 
U.S. pro-arbitration policy in Shearson has arguably carried civil RICO 
into the international arena. The Court’s emphasis on pro-arbitration pol-
icy, however, does not diminish Shearson’s significance for the Russian 
RICO case because, logically, even in light of the pro-arbitration policy, 
had it not been civil RICO with its attributes at issue, the Shearson Court 
may not have reached the decision it did. Thus, it is civil RICO’s particu-
lar attributes that stand equally behind the Shearson decision, alongside 
its pro-arbitration policy. Moreover, the Court decisions in Mitsubishi 
and Shearson highlight the Court’s deference to foreign courts’ compe-
tency to resolve civil RICO claims. 
The Court further indicated its commitment to international commerce 
and its commitment to strengthen the ability of foreign plaintiffs to vin-
                                                                                                             
 163. Id. (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972)). 
 164. See generally Jarvis, supra note 83, at 4. 
 165. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 239–40. 
 166. See Jarvis, supra note 83, at 6. 
 167. See id. at 10 (“[While] Shearson is not an international decision since it arose in a 
domestic setting and involved a dispute about the stock market, . . . the international im-
plications of the decision are clear.” Id. 
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dicate their legal rights abroad under U.S. law against U.S. entities. 
These decisions provide a strong argument to a petitioner in an action for 
recognition of a judgment under civil RICO rendered by a foreign judge. 
Moreover, the language in the above cases indicates that the Court consi-
dered foreign arbitral tribunals, as well as foreign courts, to be competent 
to apply civil RICO.168 After all, from the standpoint of applicability of 
civil RICO, the sole difference between arbitration and a judicial  
proceeding is that whereas the judiciary is a branch of government, an 
arbitral forum is a private enterprise. But under the recognition analysis, 
this distinction has no significance because U.S. courts allow substantial 
deference to a forum’s impartiality and competence, and, thus, place the 
burden on the opponent to the judgment to make a specific showing of 
fraud, lack of due process, or affront to U.S. public policy.169 That show-
ing may be made equally with respect to an arbitral award or a judgment. 
Thus, it would not be a stretch of the legal imagination to extend Shear-
son’s reasoning with respect to foreign arbitral tribunals to apply to the 
Russian RICO case. 
This argument is further amplified by contrasting the characteristics of 
arbitration with those of litigation. Foreign arbitrators are often free to 
apply substantive legal norms differently than the judiciary of a national 
that generates those norms.170 By rendering civil RICO claims arbitrable 
abroad, the Court signaled its high tolerance for U.S. law’s application 
abroad171 against U.S. respondents in a fashion likely diverging172 from 
its traditional application by U.S. courts. Courts around the world, al-
though some more than others, pay attention to their colleagues abroad 
and are presumably self-conscious for the sake of legitimacy and comity 
                                                                                                             
 168. Cf. id. at 14. For example, “[t]he International Chamber of Commerce . . . [is] the 
most important of the world’s international arbitration centers[,] . . . [but] its arbitrators’ 
familiarity with civil RICO is likely to be limited at best.” Id. at 14 n.59. 
 169. See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662–63 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that enforcement of the English judgment violates U.S. public 
policy). 
 170. See Linda Silberman, International Arbitration: Comments from a Critic, 13 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 9, 13 (2002). See generally Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and 
Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second Look” at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 453, 453 (1999). 
 171. See Silberman, supra note 170, at 10. “[W]hen [parties] have adopted [arbitra-
tion], they must be content with its informalities. . . . They must content themselves with 
looser approximations to the enforcement of their rights than those that the law accords 
them, when they resort to its machinery.” See FOLSOM, GORDON, & SPANOGLE, JR., supra 
note 34, at 732 (quoting American Almond Products Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales 
Co., Inc., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944)). 
 172. See Jarvis, supra note 83, at 18–19. 
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in the age of high-volume, transnational intercourse. Unlike arbitrators, 
however, a foreign court173 is likely to apply a foreign law analogously to 
its counterpart abroad where the law originates.174 Thus, arbitration argu-
ably is not the optimal place175 to employ a law like civil RICO that is 
notorious for its broad elements and high penalties.176 It is noteworthy 
that foreign arbitral awards under civil RICO are highly likely to be rec-
ognized in the U.S. in a streamlined, “rubber-stamp” fashion under the 
New York Convention.177 This provides further impetus for recognition 
of the Russian Court case judgment under civil RICO. 
One aforementioned point merits clarification as it is a common source 
of confusion. The proceeding in the Moscow Arbtirazh court is not an 
arbitration proceeding. The Moscow Arbtirazh court is not even an  
arbitral tribunal.178 It is a commercial court titled “arbitrazh” that many 
non-Russian speakers confuse with commercial arbitration. The Russian 
term arbitrazh179 is only an approximation and, therefore, a misleading 
translation of the English term “arbitration.”180 If the proceeding in Mos-
cow was in fact a commercial arbitration, it would place the Russian 
RICO case squarely within the ambit of the Shearson decision. But the 
only parallel between Russian arbitrazh and arbitration is that the two 
terms are homonymous. The actual commercial arbitration tribunal in 
Russia is the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber 
                                                                                                             
 173. See Silberman, supra note 170, at 10 (arguing that disputes implicating public 
policy should remain in the hands of the national judiciary or, alternatively, there must be 
a higher authority to review these arbitral awards). 
 174. See generally FOLSOM, GORDON, & SPANOGLE, JR., supra note 34, at 732. “Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration procedures are often informal and not laden with legal 
rights.” Id. 
 175. See Jarvis, supra note 83, at 16. “Many civil RICO claims . . . fail due to the ina-
bility to have evidence admitted, especially with respect to proving that the respondent 
was engaged in a racketeering enterprise.” Id. 
 176. See id. at 17. “The lack of discovery can be fatal to a civil RICO claim, since 
much of the evidence needed to prove that the respondent engaged in racketeering activi-
ties often will be obtainable only by culling through the business records of the respon-
dent.” Id. 
 177. See FOLSOM, GORDON, & SPANOGLE, JR., supra note 34, at 732 (citing Convention 
on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, concluded June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38). 
 178. See Dmitry Maleshin, The Russian Style of Civil Procedure, 21 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 543, 547 n.43 (2007) (citing WILLIAM BURNHAM ET AL., LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM 
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 50 (3d ed. 2004)). 
 179. The reason for the linguistic dissonance is likely that when Russia imported the 
term arbitration, it simply chose to apply it in a distinctive fashion, calling its wide net-
work of commercial courts arbitrazh courts. 
 180. Hendrix, supra note 129, at 148–49. 
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of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation (ICAC) in Mos-
cow.181 The lawsuit against BONY in the Moscow Arbitrazh court is in 
fact equivalent to a civil lawsuit in a court of first instance in the U.S. 
rather than an arbitration proceeding. While civil courts of other nations 
may apply foreign private law, they may not enforce strictly public or 
criminal laws of another nation. 
IV. POTENTIAL DEFENSES TO RECOGNITION 
A. Is Civil RICO a Public Law? 
BONY has objected to the Moscow Arbitrazh Court’s decision to ap-
ply civil RICO on the grounds that it is a public law.182 But even if there 
was any doubt beforehand, the Court in Shearson effectively rendered 
civil RICO a private law. The U.S. courts routinely apply foreign laws 
where conflicts-of-law and choice-of-law rules permit or mandate appli-
cation of foreign law.183 For example, in the case of Films by Jove, Inc. v. 
Berov, a United States court applied Russian copyright laws.184 But en-
forcement of public laws is customarily the exclusive domain of a judi-
ciary in a nation where these laws originate.185 For example, where 
courts in a civil proceeding apply foreign law, that foreign law must be a 
private law, because in civil cases parties are subject to the court’s juris-
                                                                                                             
 181. “The main international commercial arbitration institution in Russia is the Inter-
national Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the 
Russian Federation (ICAC) in Moscow. It is the successor to the Foreign Trade Arbitra-
tion Commission (VTAK) which was established in 1934. ICAC has dozens of years of 
experience and thousands of arbitrated cases. Currently, ICAC resolves about 600 dis-
putes annually. Its awards are routinely enforced all over the world.” International Com-
mercial Arbitration Russia, Arbitration Institutions, http://www.geocities.com/jdhevh/ 
institutions.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). This international arbitral tribunal does not 
have an official website, but the other two main arbitral tribunals, serving mainly domes-
tic parties, can be found at http://www.mosarbitration.ru. 
 182. See Parloff, supra note 2; Goldhaber, supra note 2. See generally Dodge, supra 
note 92, at 61. 
 183. See GEEROMS, supra note 56, at 1; Dodge, supra note 92, at 161. “The rights and 
liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of 
the state, which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
occurrence and the parties . . . ,” Dodge, supra note 92, at 161 n.1 (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 145(1) (1971)). 
 184. Films by Jove, Inc. v. Berov, 154 F. Supp. 2d 432, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 185. See Dodge, supra note 92, at 161 (arguing that “nations should break the public 
law taboo because cooperation in the enforcement of public law would be mutually bene-
ficial.”). 
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diction due to private conduct.186 On the other hand, if a foreign party is 
subject to a court’s jurisdiction for criminal conduct, that court will apply 
its own criminal or public law because a court in a criminal proceeding 
has jurisdiction over criminal conduct only in its own jurisdiction.187 
Accordingly, if Russian authorities were to prosecute an American  
defendant under criminal RICO, this would cause a seismic cataclysm in 
the legal community. Only the DOJ may prosecute a federal criminal 
case under U.S. criminal laws. Thus, if civil RICO is deemed inseparable 
from its penal host, rendering it a public law in the eyes of a U.S. court, 
then the Russian RICO case will be contrary to U.S. public policy and 
therefore unrecognizable. But the Court in Shearson concluded that pri-
vate parties may arbitrate civil RICO claims arising in an international 
business context.188 The Court further suggested that civil RICO may 
provide civil remedies even without a predicate criminal violation.189 
Thus the Shearson decision has affirmatively rendered civil RICO a pri-
vate law rather than public. A private law that may resolve a commercial 
dispute, applicable abroad notwithstanding any criminal violation, cannot 
function as a public law. To illustrate, the notion that civil RICO is a 
public law yet applicable in a foreign forum, would, by analogy, render 
any and every public law enforceable by a foreign judiciary. The U.S., 
and other States, would lose sovereignty over their criminal law en-
forcement regimes. BONY’s argument that civil RICO is a public law is 
unlikely to withstand the Court’s decision in Shearson. BONY may have 
a better chance of persuading a U.S. court that the Moscow Arbitrazh 
court overstepped its jurisdictional limits or that, in electing to apply civil 
                                                                                                             
 186. See id. The “public law taboo” resulted from a rule against enforcing foreign pen-
al laws, as well as the “revenue rule,” which barred enforcement of foreign revenue laws. 
Id. at 165. 
 187. “The prohibition against applying foreign penal law and (if it exists) the prohibi-
tion against applying foreign public law come into play only when a suit is brought by the 
government.” Dodge, supra note 92, at 165. The dispute whether civil RICO is public or 
private law was at the heart of BONY’s argument during early stages of the trial. Name-
ly, BONY sought dismissal of the case precisely because of the “public law taboo.” See 
Goldhaber, supra note 2. If civil RICO is a private law, then, on the surface, there is no 
“public law enforcement” problem in the Russian Court case. That, of course, does not 
answer the question whether civil RICO may be applied by a foreign court to award the 
plaintiff, a sovereign entity, lost revenue. 
 188. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239–40 (1987). 
 189. Id. In a dissenting opinion in the Canadian lost revenue case under RICO, Judge 
Calabresi stated: “[B]y enacting RICO, our government has determined that this suit 
advances our own interests, and any collateral effect furthering the governmental interests 
of a foreign sovereign is, therefore, necessarily incidental.” Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., dis-
senting) (rejecting the civil-criminal distinction made by the majority). 
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RICO, it did not apply its choice-of-law rules in good faith. Success on 
either one of those arguments may render the Russian Court’s judgment 
unrecognizable. 
B. The Arbitrazh Courts’ Jurisdiction 
The first and easy issue is whether the Moscow Arbitrazh court has ju-
risdiction over FCS’s claim. While subject matter jurisdiction is a prere-
quisite for recognition, U.S. courts tend to apply jurisdictional rules of a 
foreign court.190 Russia’s arbitrazh courts’ jurisdiction is statutory191 and 
is narrower than Russia’s courts of general jurisdiction.192 Arbitrazh 
courts assert jurisdiction over economic disputes between separate “legal 
entities” and between a “legal entity” and the government.193 Their juris-
diction, inter alia, extends to property and tax disputes.194 As part of the 
judicial reform,195 the amendment of the Code of Arbitrazh Procedure in 
1995 granted arbitrazh courts jurisdiction over foreign entities.196 While 
Russia’s courts of general jurisdiction retained jurisdiction over foreign 
parties, many foreign litigants opt for the arbitrazh courts “because of 
their greater expertise in commercial matters.”197 In the Russian RICO 
case, the Moscow Arbitrazh Court properly asserted jurisdiction over 
FCS’s claim because FCS is a governmental entity and BONY is a  
foreign commercial entity. Further, because FCS was seeking to collect 
allegedly unpaid customs duties or lost tax revenue, its claim may be 
                                                                                                             
 190. Brand, supra note 102, at 273. 
 191. See Hendrix, supra note 129, at 149. Further, “[m]ost commercial litigation is 
conducted in the arbitrazh courts.” Id. at 151. 
 192. See Hendley, supra note 130, at 95 (describing the transition of arbtirazh court 
from state agency to professional and independent judiciary). 
 193. Id. Arbitrazh courts also have jurisdiction over physical persons who are regis-
tered as “entrepreneurs.” Hendrix, supra note 129, at 149. 
 194. See Hendrix, supra note 129, at 149. Arbitrazh courts also hear bankruptcy cases, 
contract disputes, and claims of injury to business reputation. Id. They review executive 
administrative acts in the economic sphere, and rule on government liability in tort, con-
fiscation of land and other valuables, and the imposition of fines and other penalties. Id. 
 195. The reform began earlier after disintegration of the Soviet Union during the early 
1990s with enactment of the Arbitrazh Court Act in 1991 followed by the Code of Arbi-
trazh Procedure in 1992. As a result, arbiters became judges and were afforded the same 
protections. Hendrix, supra note 129, at 155. The legislation also provided for permanent 
tenure, independence, and judicial immunity. Id. at 155. Further, the enactment of Federal 
Constitutional Law on Arbitrazh Courts in 1995 granted arbitrazh courts federal status 
and established a framework of intermediate appellate courts, “circuit courts.” See id. It 
appears that the closest analogs to Russia’s arbitrazh courts in the U.S. are the U.S. Dis-
trict Courts. 
 196. See Hendrix, supra note 129, at 150. 
 197. See id. at 151. 
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characterized as an “economic dispute” within Russia’s jurisdictional 
terminology. Similarly, FCS’s claim arguably, at least in part, amounts to 
a tax claim, which arbitrazh courts may properly hear. Consequently, 
BONY’s argument that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction would 
likely fail. 
C. Russia’s Choice-of-Law Rules 
Although BONY did not assert lack of due process as a defense, it ob-
jected to the Russian court’s decision to apply civil RICO.198 BONY 
could argue in defense to recognition that the Moscow proceeding was 
“irregular” or that the court’s decision to apply civil RICO was arbitrary 
and capricious and thus lacked due process.199 Before concluding that the 
Russian Arbitrazh proceeding was “irregular”200 under Hilton, or lacked 
due process of law under the Recognition Act, a U.S. court would have 
to determine whether the Russian Court applied its choice-of-law rules in 
good faith, since U.S. courts defer to foreign courts’ application of their 
own rules. 
First, it is important to note that the overall theme of Russia’s choice-
of-law principles contained in Russia’s Civil Code201 is to allow applica-
tion of foreign law in comparatively many more202 instances than, say, a 
U.S. court would.203 In general, Russia’s courts may apply foreign law 
anytime a party is foreign or where the dispute arises in a transnational 
                                                                                                             
 198. See generally Goldhaber, supra note 2; Key Facts, supra note 5, at 1. 
 199. The argument here would rely on due process because the exuberant monetary 
penalties authorized under civil RICO provide a lucrative motive for abuse of legal 
process. 
 200. It may be argued that because of the unusual nature of the civil RICO claim in 
Russia, the proceeding in the Moscow Arbitrazh Court was “irregular.” Although it may 
be argued, for example, that by virtue of the unprecedented nature of the lawsuit, BONY 
lacked sufficient notice. But such interpretation of “regular proceeding” under Hilton 
would likely foreclose any creative application of jurisdictional or choice-of-law prin-
ciples and, thus, is unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny. Arguably, a more concrete 
affront is required for a proceeding to be irregular under Hilton, such as violations of due 
process requirements under the Recognition Act. 
 201. See generally Maleshin, supra note 178; Dimitry Y. Maleshin, Some Cultural 
Characteristics of the New Russian Code of Civil Procedure of 2002, 10 Zeitschrift für 
Zivilprozess Int’l 385, 385–89 (2005). 
 202. The drafters’ willingness to allow foreign law into Russia’s courts to supplement 
its own legal norms reflects their implicit intuition that Russia’s post-Soviet legal system, 
in its current incarnation, remains relatively young, as it is still undergoing gradual trans-
formations that started in the early 1990s. See generally B. L. ZIMMENKO, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (William E. Butler ed., 2007) (discussing the 
relationship between Russian law and international law). 
 203. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW §§ 6–8 (1971). 
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context.204 Until the enactment of Part III of the Russian Federation Civil 
Code205 (“RFCC”) in 2001, choice-of-law was governed by the Funda-
mentals of Civil Legislation (“FCL”), which was enacted in 1991.206 Part 
III has a separate Article, titled “International Private Law,” which sets 
out currently effective choice-of-law rules.207 Part III of RFCC is sig-
nificantly different from FCL choice-of-law rules in that the latter no 
longer operate as a set of statutory defaults dictating choice–of-law on 
the basis of the type of transaction underlying the dispute.208 The discus-
sion below will assume that the Moscow Arbitrazh Court could have  
reasonably applied either set of choice-of-law rules. Because the conduct 
and transactions underlying the FCS’s lawsuit against BONY occurred 
during the late 1990s, prior to enactment of the RFCC’s Part III in 2001, 
the Moscow Arbitrazh Court may have reasonably chosen to apply the 
choice-of-law rules that were in force at the time, namely the FCL. As 
illustrated below, both the FCL and the RFCC allow the Moscow Arbi-
trazh Court to apply U.S. law to the FCS’s claim against BONY. 
The FCL provided an array of statutory defaults that dictated whose 
law applied in a dispute between two foreign parties.209 For example, in a 
tort action, the arbitrazh courts applied the law of the country where the 
tort occurred.210 Importantly, in an action for unjust enrichment, arbi-
trazh courts applied the law of the country where enrichment ultimately 
                                                                                                             
 204. See Hendrix, supra note 129, at 163–65. For example, the Code of Arbitrazh 
procedure gives judges broad discretion to “determin[e] the ‘existence and contents’ of 
foreign law, if applicable to the dispute.” Id. at 163. 
 205. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 6 (Russ.), translated at 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/PartIII/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
 206. See Hendrix, supra note 129, at 163. 
 207. See id. at 164. 
 208. See id. It seems that Russia’s choice-of-law rules have traveled evolutionary paths 
similar to those of the choice-of-law rules in the U.S., having shifted away from rigid 
defaults dictated by the nature of the cause for action and toward a more rigorous policy 
and interest based analysis. See generally William M. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts: 
A Graphic Understanding on Interest Analysis, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 317, 319 (1982). 
 209. See Hendrix, supra note 129, at 164–65. For example, under Fundamentals of 
Civil Legislation, art. 166.1 (1), sale contracts were governed by the law of the seller’s 
country. See Id. Where a party is acting as a lessor, licensor, bailee, agent carrier, freight 
forwarder, insurer, lender, donor, guarantor, or pledgor, statutory default requires applica-
tion of the law of that party’s country. Id. 
 210. See Hendrix, supra note 129, at 165. This is similar to the American choice of law 
rule based on the place of injury. See Richman, supra note 208, at 319. This rule, howev-
er, has been supplanted by Currie’s interest analysis in most modern American jurisdic-
tions. Id. 
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occurred.211 For example, where a Russian company mistakenly wired 
money to an account abroad, the arbitrazh court found that unjust 
enrichment212 occurred in the country in which the wire payment was 
received or credited.213 Thus, that country’s law governed.214 By analogy, 
if the Moscow Arbitrazh Court applied the FCL choice-of-law rules, cha-
racterizing the customs claim as one for unjust enrichment, it would  
reasonably and in good-faith be able to proceed under applicable U.S. 
law against BONY. Since FCS is a Russian customs authority seeking to 
recover customs duties, revenue allegedly lost due to “racketeering activ-
ity,” and damages arising from a bank doing business on its territory, 
civil RICO would be the applicable law.215 It is an appropriate analog to 
a similar suit in the U.S. where unpaid taxes, lost due to cross-border 
“racketeering activity,” may be recovered in a civil RICO lawsuit.216  
Accordingly, since this line of analysis is available to the Moscow Arbi-
trazh Court under the FCL choice-of-law rules, BONY would be unable 
to argue “irregularity,” or lack of due process under the Recognition Act. 
The currently effective code of civil procedure (Part III of the RFCC) 
changes the choice-of-law rules in Russia.217 It states in pertinent part: 
The law applicable to civil legal relations involving . . . [a] foreign citi-
zen[] or foreign legal entities or civil legal relations complicated by 
another foreign factor, in particular, in cases when an object of civil 
rights is located abroad shall be determined on the basis . . . [of] the 
                                                                                                             
 211. Richman, supra note 208, at 319. “At its heart, a civil RICO claim is an action for 
fraud.” Jarvis, supra note 83, at 14. 
 212. In the U.S., unjust enrichment is a common law contractual cause of action for 
restitution. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 824–29 (4th ed. 2004). But in Russia, 
unjust enrichment applies where a party gets “something for nothing.” See Hendrix,  
supra note 129, at 165. 
 213. Hendrix, supra note 129, at 165 (illustrating the application of this principle in a 
case where a Russian company sought to recover a mistaken remittance to Latvian bank 
account, and the court held that enrichment occurred in Latvia and that Latvian law must 
therefore be applied). 
 214. Id. 
 215. “The Second Circuit has recognized that lost tax revenue is a cognizable RICO 
injury,” Farnam, supra note 16, at 846; see Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 267. 
 216. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 267; Farnam, supra note 16, at 844 n.7 (citing 
Mo. v. W.E.R., 55 F.3d 350, 357 (8th Cir 1995) (holding that the State has a cause of 
action under civil RICO); United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352, 1355 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Ill. Dep’t of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the gov-
ernment stated a claim for civil RICO for repeated mailing of false tax returns, a mail 
fraud violation)). 
 217. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art.1186 (Russ.), translated at 
http://www.russian-civil-code.com/PartIII/SectionVI/Subsection1/Chapter66.html (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2009). 
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present Code, . . . and usage recognised in the Russian Federation. . . . 
If under [the above] . . . it is impossible to determine [the applicable 
law] . . . the law of the country with which a civil legal relation compli-
cated by a foreign factor is most closely related shall apply.218 
On its face, it appears that application of a foreign law may be trig-
gered when a foreign party is present, when a lawsuit is “complicated by 
another foreign factor,” or “when an object” of the claim “is located 
abroad.” The last clause in Russian, as in English translation, means that 
the law of the country with which the lawsuit (“civil legal relation”) is 
most closely related will apply.219 This leaves tremendous room for in-
terpretation of the “most closely related” element. This clause does not 
define criteria by which to evaluate “closeness,” and the term “civil legal 
relation,” meaning the lawsuit, is equally vague. 
Applying RFCC choice-of-law rules, the Moscow Arbitrazh Court 
could again have reasonably decided, in good faith, to apply U.S. law. 
BONY is a foreign party and the lawsuit is seriously complicated by a 
“foreign factor” that the allegedly illicit money transfers were facilitated 
by “racketeering activity” abroad and the money went to the U.S. More-
over, considering the number of foreign factors in totality, this lawsuit is 
arguably “most closely related” to the U.S., except for the harm that was 
allegedly suffered by Russian deposit holders and the Russian economy 
as a whole. Again, civil RICO, being the proper cause of action in an 
analogous suit in the U.S., would properly apply to FCS’s claim against 
BONY. At the minimum, there are no legal obstacles in Russian law for 
the Moscow Arbitrazh court to apply civil RICO. In sum, BONY would 
have been unlikely to defend against recognition on the ground that the 
Moscow Arbitrazh Court, in electing to apply civil RICO, did not apply 
its choice-of-law rules in good faith. 
D. The Revenue Rule 
A critical issue remains after resolution of the procedural issues dis-
cussed above: the so-called revenue rule.220 The revenue rule is a U.S. 
“conflict of laws doctrine that allows a court to decline to enforce a for-
                                                                                                             
 218. Id. 
 219. This “most closely related” element is arguably parallel to the modern U.S. 
choice-of-law framework whose guiding principle is to determine the state with the 
strongest interest. Richman, supra note 208, at 319. 
 220. The rule is over two hundred years old. It emerged in England, when Lord Mans-
field stated that “no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another.” Holman v. 
Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120 (K.B.). “In these cases, 18th Century British courts 
chose to uphold contracts that violated foreign law in order to protect the British smug-
gling trade.” Farnam, supra note 16, at 849 n.65. 
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eign government’s tax claim or judgment.”221 Canada recently brought a 
lawsuit in the U.S. under civil RICO to recover lost tax revenues.222 The 
Second Circuit held that the “revenue rule bars Canada’s claim because 
the RICO damages would be calculated based on lost revenues” and that 
would amount to enforcing Canada’s tax laws.223 The revenue rule has 
been widely criticized224 and many commentators argue that the revenue 
rule should be abandoned225 because the rule rests on an archaic policy 
                                                                                                             
 221. Farnam, supra note 16, at 843 (arguing that Reynolds was wrongly decided be-
cause the court misapplied the revenue rule, and articulating a policy rationale for why 
the revenue rule should not bar civil RICO claims); see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14 (1964); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§483 (1987). 
 222. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 106–
07 (2d Cir. 2001). During the 1990s, R.J. Reynolds allegedly was part of a scheme to 
smuggle tobacco to avoid Canadian tax laws. Id. The Court framed the problem in the 
following way: “The illicit tobacco . . . has become a global problem. In recent years, 
American tobacco companies have apparently smuggled cigarettes into Canada, the Eu-
ropean Union, Ecuador, Honduras, Belize, and Colombia. Following the Reynolds [ ] 
decision, other civil RICO cases have been pursued, most recently in Florida.” Farnam, 
supra note 16, at 844 (citing Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 
268 F.3d 103, 125 (2d Cir. 2001); Ecuador v. Philip Morris, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. 
Fla. 2002); European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 
2001)). 
 223. Att’y Gen. of Can., 268 F.3d at 106–07. “RICO allows foreign states to assert 
claims to remedy racketeering injuries, [but] the Reynolds . . . decision now effectively 
nullifies their cause of action if they seek to recover lost tax revenue in the Second Cir-
cuit.” Farnam, supra note 16, at 844. There is a strong criticism that, in the tobacco cases, 
courts applied the revenue rule in a formulaic and artificial manner because the foreign 
governments argued that at issue were violations of U.S. law and determining liability 
under civil RICO “required merely the recognition of the tax laws in question.” See Bux-
baum, supra note 13, at 284 (citing Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant the Attorney General of 
Canada at 3, Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 
103 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 224. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483. Notably, the Second 
Circuit in United States v. Trapilo, held that 
the revenue rule did not mandate dismissal every time a foreign revenue law 
was implicated. Instead, the revenue rule should be applied only in cases that 
would interfere with the separation of powers. For example, the claim might be 
barred if the court would otherwise have to decide a foreign relations question 
more properly reserved to the political branches. 
Farnam, supra note 16, at 855 (citing United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 
1997)). 
 225. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 283–92; Franam, supra note 16. See generally 
William J. Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revo-
cation of the Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 265 (2000). 
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rationale that is no longer valid.226 BONY probably would have defended 
against the recognition action arising out of the Russian RICO case by 
characterizing the FCS’s claim as a civil RICO claim for violation of 
Russia’s revenue laws.227 The issue would present a U.S. court with the 
opportunity to evaluate the validity of the revenue rule in light of the 
novel approach of filing a lost revenue lawsuit abroad, rather than in the 
U.S., which is arguably a major innovation from a strategic standpoint 
when it comes to “transnational regulatory” litigation.228 The “revenue 
rule” policy rationales are grounded in the “foreign revenue claims” do-
mestic effects.229 These rationales arguably crumble in light of the claim 
being brought abroad rather than in the U.S.230 Thus, the question of 
whether it would be a bar to Russia’s RICO case recognition should be 
re-evaluated. Evidently, to the extent that U.S. entities violate foreign 
revenue laws, there is a continual demand from foreign plaintiffs to liti-
gate “lost revenue” claims in U.S. courts. To any transnational litigation 
observer, the Russian RICO case is a foreseeable outcome of U.S. courts’ 
commitment to the revenue rule. If the Russian Court case had suc-
ceeded, it would have been likely to serve as a “green light” for civil 
RICO litigation in other countries to recover lost tax revenues. U.S. 
courts’ continual commitment to the revenue rule signals to potential 
foreign claimants that U.S. courts have little regard for their legal rights 
under their domestic revenue laws against U.S. entities. Nonrecognition 
pursuant to the “revenue rule” is discretionary. U.S. courts are not  
required, though permitted, to refuse recognition of claims where such 
recognition would amount to enforcement of foreign revenue laws.231 
Accordingly, if U.S. courts recognize the Russian Court’s judgments, 
then that will amount to the final “nail in the coffin” of the revenue rule. 
                                                                                                             
 226. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 283–90; Farnam, supra note 16, at 852–54. 
 227. Cf. Farnam, supra note 16, at 854 (citing United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 
(1st Cir 1996)). 
 228. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
 229. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 278 (discussing the revenue rule and its role in 
“transnational regulatory” litigation); Farnam, supra note 16, at 846 (arguing that the 
revenue rule should be abandoned). 
 230. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 283–92. See generally Farnam, supra note 16, at 
846 
 231. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483–84 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(holding that the revenue rule does not bar a suit by a foreign sovereign to recover civil 
RICO damages for lost tax revenues and that application of the revenue rule was discre-
tionary). The Nabisco court eventually held that the European Community was unable to 
demonstrate injury separate from that of the member states and thus failed to allege the 
injury needed to bring suit under RICO. Id. at 501–02. 
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There are strong arguments for recognition and relaxation, or complete 
abandonment, of the revenue rule with respect to “transnational regulato-
ry” judgments. As a matter of policy, the U.S. should send a signal that a 
U.S. court will tolerate foreign “lost revenue” judgments rendered under 
civil RICO.232 Currently, U.S. entities conducting business abroad are, in 
effect, allowed to avoid foreign tax laws with impunity because U.S. 
courts will not hear foreign revenue claims under civil RICO or other-
wise. 233 Recognition of a foreign action for lost revenue would encourage 
“transnational regulatory” litigation;234 namely, it would allow foreign 
sovereign claimants to litigate their “lost revenue” claims abroad. This is 
arguably a desirable effect because it implements Congress’s intent be-
hind RICO in eliminating “racketeering” activity and remedying the 
damages such activity causes.235 It would serve both remedial and deter-
rent functions, which preoccupied the Supreme Court in Shearson. 
Moreover, litigation over “lost revenue,” taking place in a foreign forum 
where injury actually occurred, would preserve U.S. judicial resources as 
those cases tend to be complex and protracted.236 In fact, the revenue 
rule’s application has been uneven, fragmented, and controversial.237  
Existing scholarly criticism of the revenue rule coupled with the novelty 
of the Russian RICO case scenario should ultimately move U.S. courts to 
relax the revenue rule with respect to “transnational regulatory” judg-
ments. 
V. A MODIFIED STANDARD FOR RECOGNITION 
Throughout their history, U.S. courts have helped law evolve to ac-
commodate the changing domestic and global conditions that come with 
increased cross-border activity.238 The current regime for recognition of 
foreign money judgments, however, works well; it has been fine-tuned 
for over a century since the decision in Hilton.239 But if U.S. courts are to 
                                                                                                             
 232. The Nabisco court stated that U.S. courts have the ability to interpret foreign rev-
enue laws. See European Cmty., 150 F. Supp. 2d at 484 n.16. 
 233. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 265–57. 
 234. Id. at 255. “Transnational regulatory” litigation, as coined by Professor Buxbaum, 
encompassed “certain cases brought under U.S. regulatory law including antitrust law, 
securities law and [RICO], that operate similarly to transnational public law cases: they 
seek to apply a shared norm, in domestic courts, for the benefit of the international com-
munity.” Id. 
 235. Cf. Farnam, supra note 16, at 857. 
 236. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 13 (discussing the type of cases that fall into 
the category of “transnational regulatory” litigation). 
 237. See generally Farnam, supra note 16, at 858; Kovatch, Jr., supra note 225, at 265. 
 238. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 280. 
 239. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,163–64 (1895). 
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take the approach described above to the Russian Court’s now-
hypothetical judgment, the recognition regime will require either some 
stretching of its extant elements to accommodate foreign judgments or a 
modification to account for judgments under U.S. law. For example, in 
Mitsubishi, where the Court allowed foreign arbitrators to apply the pri-
vate cause of action under the Sherman Act against U.S. parties, the 
Court expressed its concern over the consequences of releasing its  
monopolistic control of the antitrust laws: “Having permitted the arbitra-
tion to go forward, the national courts of the United States will have the 
opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate 
interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed.”240 
The recognition of the Russian Court judgment would echo the “custo-
mary and understandable unwillingness to cede jurisdiction of a claim 
arising under domestic law to a foreign court.”241 The Mitsubishi court 
concluded that “[w]hile the efficacy . . . requires that substantive review 
at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require  
intrusive inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the an-
titrust claims and actually decided them.”242 
Similarly, in addition to traditional recognition analysis, a U.S. court 
should conduct a minimal inquiry to determine whether a foreign court 
“took cognizance” of the civil RICO claim and “actually decided” it. One 
way U.S. courts might meet the challenge presented by the Russian 
RICO case is to allow the common law defense of “manifest disregard 
for the law”243 in an action for recognition of foreign money judgments. 
Currently, this defense may be invoked with respect to recognition of 
arbitral awards where a foreign tribunal applied arbitrable U.S. law 
against a U.S. party.244 This is an appropriate “doctrinal transplant” from 
                                                                                                             
 240. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 
(1985). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2002). 
The court’s “standard of review under this judicially created doctrine is ‘severely li-
mited.’ To vacate the award . . . [the court] must find ‘something beyond and different 
from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply 
the law.’” Id. (citing Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int’l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d 
Cir. 1967); see also Folkways Music Publishers., Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (“In order to advance the goals of arbitration, courts may vacate awards only 
for an overt disregard of the law and not merely for an erroneous interpretation.”); Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Al-
though the bounds of this ground have never been defined, it clearly means more than 
error or misunderstanding with respect to the law.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 244. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d at 209. The court explained: 
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the law of recognition of foreign arbitral awards to the recognition of 
foreign money judgments. Both legal regimes “favor” minimal substan-
tive review of the underlying merits, and both presume the competency 
of foreign forums to apply and decide U.S. law.245 Incorporating a  
“manifest disregard for the law” defense into recognition proceedings 
would allow just the necessary amount of protection to U.S. defendants. 
A defendant should bear the burden of establishing that the foreign court 
manifestly disregarded the substance of the U.S. law.246 This approach 
strikes an equitable balance between both parties in the litigation. It  
protects the integrity of the laws and the judiciary of both nations. It pro-
vides a minimal normative standard to foreign courts applying U.S. law. 
Finally, this approach fosters desirable predictability and furthers the 
equitable goals of “transnational regulatory” litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
A judgment from the Russian Court case will never reach U.S. shores, 
but if it had—or, if and when another of its kind does indeed arrive—it 
will raise a number of complex issues that will have to be resolved dur-
ing the recognition action. As illustrated above, nothing in terms of legal 
doctrine prevents a foreign court from applying civil RICO. Moreover, 
the U.S Supreme Court has given a “green light” to foreign courts to en-
tertain civil RICO claims. Moreover, BONY will not be able to challenge 
the Russian Court’s judgment on the grounds of “irregularity” or lack of 
due process. The nature of the lawsuit does not reveal any issues contrary 
to U.S. public policy so as to bar recognition under the Recognition Act. 
A U.S. court, however, will likely face an objection by BONY to the 
recognition based on the revenue rule. Nevertheless, the archaic revenue 
rule should not preclude recognition of the Russian Court’s judgment. 
Litigation in Russia’s courts, as a matter of U.S. policy, is a salutary de-
velopment that does not offend any of the archaic policies behind the 
                                                                                                             
The two-prong test for ascertaining whether an arbitrator has manifestly disre-
garded the law. . . . We first consider whether the “governing law alleged to 
have been ignored by the arbitrators [was] well defined, explicit, and clearly 
applicable.” We then look to the knowledge actually possessed by the arbitra-
tor. The arbitrator must “appreciate[] the existence of a clearly governing legal 
principle but decide[] to ignore or pay no attention to it.” Both of these prongs 
must be met before a court may find that there has been a manifest disregard of 
law. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 245. See Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d at 204. 
 246. See id. at 200. 
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revenue rule. But U.S. courts should adopt a safeguard that will protect 
U.S. parties from arbitrary or bad faith application of U.S. law in foreign 
courts in violation of due process. U.S. courts should modify the current 
recognition doctrine by adopting a defense that will focus on the manner 
in which foreign courts apply such complex statutes as civil RICO. The 
recognition of the Russian Court’s judgment will advance a number of 
significant interests: namely, comity, “transnational regulatory” litiga-
tion, international cooperation in law enforcement, and the integrity of 
foreign and domestic judicial processes. 
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